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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STArfE OF UTAH

AMY J. WALTERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs.-

i\ATIONAL BEVERAGES, INC.,
a corporation, and STREATOR
CHEVROLET COMPANY, a
corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case
No.10582

Brief of Respondent,
National Beverages, Inc.
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action for breach of contract, wherein
Plaintiff claims that her participation in a prize contest
sponsored by defendants constituted a contractural relationship, and that she was entitled to the award of
the first prize of such contest, a 1965 Corvair Monza
sport coupe; that her damages are the value of that
motor vehicle.
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DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The trial court granted the motions for Summan
Judgment of the defendants, no cause of action.
·

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks reversal of the Summarv .Jud"
. '
ment in favor of defendants.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This defendant is in substantial agreement with
the facts set forth in the Brief of Plaintiff, as reflecting
the facts embraced in the record of the case. This c]e.
fendant does take exception to the conclusion claimer!
by plaintiff that the entry blank or form sets forth an
order of prize drawing. This defendant would also
clarify that the plaintiff has actively participated in
hundreds of prize contests (Deposition of plaintiff, R-41,
p. 4) and in this particular contest deposited in excess of
three hundred (300) entry stubs (Deposition of plaintiff,
R. 41, p. 15) ; and that entries of plaintiff were taken to
Streator Chevrolet Company and some deposited hy
plaintiff, her husband, daughter and friends. (Deposition
of plaintiff, R-41, PP- 15, 32). There is no indication in
the record that plaintiff personally deposited the entry
stub in question.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
NO CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFlDNDANTS.
In the deposition of plaintiff she testifies in reference to this defendant:

"No, I didn't have a contract with them, no."
(Deposition of plaintiff, R-46, p. 6)
The plaintiff, however, claims in her brief the existence
of a contract, which it is submitted is error, for there is
a want of cons,ideration, and even assuming that an offer
was made by defendants, there has been no acceptance
by the plaintiff.
(A.) There is a wa;nt of consideration.

Nowhere in the complaint does plaintiff set forth
facts which show the existence of such consideration as
will support a contract. It is fundamental that consideration is an essential element of a contract; a naked
promise cannot constitute a contract or be enforced and
that "·ant of consideration is a defense for nonperformance of a promise. 17 Am. J ur. 2d, Contracts, Sec. 86,
pp. 428-429.
The 1956 Case of Dumas v. Todd, et al, (Ga.) 92
S.K 2cl 265, involved a factual situation wherein auc~
tioneers offered to give a Ford automobile to the winner
of a drawing, which was held in connection with an
auction, and which required the presence of the. con-
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testant to win. The plaintiff deposited entry tickets ill
the container provided, and his name was drawn; the
plaintiff was present but could not produce a stub to
match the winning ticket, which requirement had he 011
imposed without prior notice. Defendants refused tn
give plaintiff the automobile and action was hroug] 11
for recovery of the value.
The Court in Dumas affirmed a denial of recoven
"
holding in part that there was no '' * * '' contractual re.
lationship shown, because of lack of consideration.
* * * The fact that the Ford in the instant case wa,
offered to encourage people to attend the auction doe,
not constitute consideration, it shows motive, but nut
legal consideration * * *." (at 266)

It is submitted that the foregoing decision is ap
plicable here, that there is a want of consideration in
the instant case, and hence no contractual relationship
between the parties.
(B.) Assimiing that an off er has been made by r/1
fendal/tts, there has been no acceptance bytlir
plaintiff.

The plaintiff in her legal argument has assumer!
performance on her part of all rules of the contest in
question. Conceding for argument only that the adwr·
tisement of the contest and publication of the rules co11
stituted an offer, Query: \Vhere in the complaint, or
other pleadings, or record, does the plaintiff allege.
assert, or plead compliance with a1l of the terms of the
offer, or printed rules of the contest '1 No such corn·
pliance is indicated.
4
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1'o tl1e contrary and as an example, Rule 2 of the
rules of the contest provides:
"'rake your entry blank to the Streator Chevrolet
showroom for deposit in the Sweepstakes barrel.
And don't forget, while you're at Streators be
sure to look over the all-new exciting line of Chevrolets for '65." (R-33)
'l'hrre is no claim that plaintiff complied with the rules
hy her personally taking the entry blank in question to
tlir showroom aforementioned; in fact the testimony of
plaintiff is:

'' '' * * My husband went in and deposited, my
daughter went in and deposited them, and my
friend went in and deposited for me.'' (Deposition of Plaintiff, R-41, p. 15. See also p. 32)
It is elementary that there must be an unqualified acceptance of an offer to sustain a contract. The plaintiff
has not alleged in her complaint compliance with all of
the terms of the rules of the contest, and therefore no
binding contract has come into existence. See 17 Am
.J ur 2d, Contracts, Sec. 40, p. 378.

POINT II
IF A CONTRA,CT EXISTS BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANTS IT IS UNKNFORCEABLE.
Article VI, Section 28, of the Constitution of Utah
provides:
''The Legislature shall not authorize any
game of chance, lottery or gift enterprise under
.
,,
any pretense or f 01 any purpose.
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The aforementioned provision is declaratory of the
public policy in Utah, and any game of chance, lottery
or gift enterprise is in contravention thereof. Comme 1:_
cial Travelers Insurance Co. v. Carlson, 104 U. 41, 137
P. 2d 656.
A contract against public policy is unenforceable.
As is stated in 17 Am .•Tur. 2d, Contracts, Sec. 174, p. 532:

'' * * * As a settled general rule, agreements or
contracts agains't public policy are illegal and void.
An agreement or contract made in violation of
established public policy is not binding and will
not be enforced. * "' "'''
Plaintiff has characterized the contest and her participation therein as contractual in nature; if this be the
case, the so-called agreement would be in the nature of a
game of chance, lottery or gift enterprise, and would
offend the constitutional declaration aforementioned. We
submit that such an agreement would be void and nnenforceable.
This conclusion is further supported by Section
76-27-9, U.C.A. 1953, which provides:
A lottery is any scheme for the disposal or
distribution of property by chance among persons who have paid or promised to pay any valuable consideration for the chance of obtaining
such property or a portion of it, or for any share
or any interest in such property, upon any agreement,· understanding or expectation that it is to
be distributed or disposed of by lot or chance,
whether called a lottery, raffle or gift enterprise,
or by ·whatever name the same may be known.
6
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Plaintiff's contention that a contract exists presupposes
the existence of valuable consideration in support thereof.
As heretofore set forth in Point I, we do not agree with
the conclusion that either consideration or a contract
exists. Nevertheless, if there be cons id era ti on, then the
contest would be a lottery in contravention of Section
76-27-10, U.C.A. 1953, and any resulting agreement would
be illegal and unenforceable.
It is the general rule, and the law in Utah, that no
private right can arise from participation in a lottery, for
the Court will grant no relief to a party to a lottery, or
lend its aid in enforcing any agreement thereunder. In
Blair v. Lowham, 73 U. 599, 276 P. 292, the plaintiff
brought an action for the value of a one-half interest
in an automobile under a verbal agreement between plaintiff and defendant to pool their admission tickets to a
Labor Day celebration at Lagoon Resort. The automobile was awarded the defendant who held the winning
ticket, which was determined, by chance, to entitle the
holder to the automobile. Defendant denied plaintiff's
elaimed interest.

The Court in reversing a judgment in favor of plaintiff stated:

'' * " * The sole reliance here is upon transactions prohibited by law. Courts will not grant
either of the parties relief in such cases " " " ''
(at 294)
See also Maughs v. Porter, (Va.) 161SE242, (1931);
Dennis v. Weaver, (Ga.) 121 S.E. 2d 190 (1961).
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It is therefore submitt0d that any contract or agTe 0
ment deemed to result from the contest in question would
be void and not enforceable.

POINT III
THE DRAWING PROCEDURE FOLLOWED
IN THE CONTEST WAS NOT UNFAIR OR
PRE.JUDICIAL, OR TN" VIOLATION OF AKY
RIGHT OF PLAINTIFF.
The order of drawing of the contest was not specifically set forth in the announcement or rules of the contest. The entry form listed the prizes of gifts to be
awarded, not the order of drawing. The prizes so listed
were in sequence of value.
The drawing procedure adopted ·was fair to all participants. The chance of the plaintiff to win a prize, including the most valuable prize, was neither diminished.
diluted, or decreased b~T virtue of the drawing procednre
adopted. Each entry of the plaintiff had the same mathematical chance of selection as that of any other participant, no more, no less.
The plaintiff did not object to the procedure followed, although she had reasonable opportunity to do so:
such failure constitutes a waiver to object, and she is
estopped to object now.
This defendant adopts by reference and incorporate;;
herein all points and argument of the brief of Streator
Cheyrolet Company, respondent herein.
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CONCLUSION
The Judgment of the lower Court should be affirmed
for the reasons heretofore set forth.

Respectfully submitted,
TUFT AND MARSHALL
J. REED TUFT
53 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
RAYMOND W. GEE
400 Executive Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defen4antRespondent
NATIONAL BEVERAGES, INC.
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